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Should PLUS be nationalised? PDF Print E-mail

Tags: Khazanah Nasional Bhd | nationalising | PLUS | privatisation

Written by Nadia S Hassan and Cindy Yeap   
Monday, 13 April 2009 00:00
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YES
by Nadia S Hassan

As the government holds off raising toll rates yet again, it becomes clear that a long-term solution is sorely needed. And nationalising PLUS Expressways Bhd not only makes economic sense, but it would help to put the government back in the rakyat’s good books.

If anything, it would save the government the embarrassment of having to do an about-turn like what happened a month ago. To recap, barely 24 hours after the then Works Minister announced that toll rates on five major highways will be raised, the decision was overturned, resulting in many red faces.

As per the concession agreements, toll rates are to be revised every three years, failing which the government is contractually obligated to pay compensation to the toll road operators.

However, the government simply cannot keep paying compensation to these private companies in perpetuity. The government forked out RM2.84 billion in gross compensation to PLUS alone between 2003 and 2008.

But if the toll rates keep increasing, the numbers being put forward are hard to swallow. For example, a one-way trip between Kuala Lumpur and Penang works out to RM86 now, but come 2038 — when the concession period on PLUS’ highways ends — the cost would have doubled to RM168.

Thus, it is no surprise that over the past couple of months, two proposals have been put forward to the government from opposing sides of the political fence concerning the nationalisation of PLUS.

And PLUS was chosen rather than the other toll road operators for two simple reasons. The first is that it is the biggest toll concessionaire in the country, with the most number of roads under its belt. Thus, nationalising it would have the biggest effect, not only on the public at large, but also economic activity. The second reason is logic, since the government already has an effective interest of around 74% in PLUS.

This is through the government’s investment arm Khazanah Nasional Bhd, which holds 63.88% of PLUS (inclusive of shares held under UEM Group Bhd) and the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) that holds 11.38%.

In February, the opposition party DAP provided the government with a proposal that aimed to make PLUS toll free by 2016. The suggestion put forward by DAP was for the government to make a general offer for the shares it does not already own in PLUS at RM3.30 per share.

According to DAP, the cost of the acquisition would be funded by issuing Malaysian Government Securities at 3% interest, costing RM413 million per annum. Total repayment would amount to RM16.2 billion over six years, which would be settled using cash from PLUS.

Barely a month later, MCA announced that it was also suggesting to the government to nationalise PLUS through Khazanah, with the latter acquiring the remaining 26% stake on the open market. MCA suggested a range of RM3.50 to RM4 per share, which puts the total acquisition price at RM4.55 billion to RM5.2 billion.

Taking MCA’s example, at RM4 per share, and including PLUS’ outstanding long-term debts as at Dec 31, 2008, of RM9.52 billion, the total cost of acquiring the company comes to RM14.72 billion. And that is before stripping out PLUS’ cash pile of RM2.2 billion as at the end of FY2008.

In total, the cost would be less than RM13 billion. Assuming this is paid over 10 years, the amount could balloon to closer to RM18 billion. Divide the sum of RM18 billion by the period left in the concession, which is 29 years, and it works out to about RM620 million a year, which is still less than the RM730 million compensation paid out to PLUS in 2008.

Admittedly, this rough calculation does not take into account the time value of money but it proves the point that the funds could be put to better use elsewhere, for example, in improving the country’s inadequate public transport system.

Another argument goes that roads are a public service and should be run with the good of the people in mind rather than profitability. Thus, after nationalising PLUS, any increase in toll rates would be only for operational needs rather than for contractual obligations. And PLUS’ strong cash flow of RM1.1 billion to RM1.4 billion yearly from 2004 to 2007, excluding any receipts from government compensation, shows that waiving the toll increase is possible.

Based on PLUS’ closing price of RM2.96 on April 9, both proposals are suggesting a premium of between 11.5% and 35.1% per share, which is decent enough to keep the minority shareholders happy. Over the past 12 months, PLUS’ highest close was RM3.24.

While the amount to nationalise PLUS is substantial, especially given the current economic slowdown, it should be noted that it would not be a burden to the government as the company is profitable with strong cash flow. The company can finance the takeover without drawing from the government’s coffers.

Then, there is the role of the EPF to consider if the government decides to go with MCA’s proposal. As the only other shareholder aside from Khazanah, the EPF can act as another watchdog as to how PLUS is run.

 While some may argue that this will result in another “minority shareholder” scenario, it should be kept in mind that the EPF is still a government-linked body, rather than several private individuals.

At present, nationalising PLUS is still just a suggestion. The good news is, with public opinion carrying the strength it does now, it can be assured that the government will not take such a proposal lightly. But to be frank, nothing puts a smile on the face of the people more than seeing a toll booth demolished.

 

No
by Cindy Yeap

While toll hikes and compensation clauses in the concession agreement could be nullified if the government wholly owns PLUS, getting Khazanah to buy out the minority shareholders of the toll concessionaire would involve a significant upfront cost. And this would be incurred without the rakyat being any better off than they would be if the government were to cap toll increases by compensating PLUS.

In fact, in the short term, the rakyat may even lose out if PLUS is privatised at this time, when a lot of money is needed to pump-prime the economy. Here’s why.

The immediate and obvious beneficiaries of such a move would be PLUS’ minority shareholders. This is because the rakyat will still be paying toll for a good 10 years as the government, via Khazanah, will need the cash flow to service the upfront cost it would incur in getting 100% of PLUS.

And for the government to get 100% of PLUS, it would first need to pay a good premium to entice the minorities. Otherwise, it risks ending up with a private entity with the so-called lopsided toll concession clauses still in force, unless minorities still on board the privatised entity agree to do away with these clauses.

Assuming a 20% premium to the existing share price of RM3, Khazanah or the government would incur a RM6.5 billion upfront cost to take over the 36% block held by minorities (RM4.5 billion if the EPF’s 11.4% is excluded). The tally goes up to RM15 billion upon adding PLUS’ RM8.5 billion net debt. There are also the finance charges related to the government debt papers issued for the buyout, which would send total costs ballooning to RM20 billion, even at 3% coupon.

To service this RM20 billion, the government would have no choice but to continue collecting toll at existing rates for at least 10 more years. The 10 years is one-third of the 29 years left in the PLUS concession (it ends in 2038). But the fact is that — and it’s something even the DAP admits — toll collection would still continue, perhaps at more reasonable rates, to cover maintenance and any upgrading costs.

But is the prospect — not a promise — of cheaper toll rates 10 years down the road a good enough reason to order PLUS’ nationalisation, especially amid slowing economic growth?

The RM730 million compensation that the government paid PLUS in 2008 does not look as big when stacked against the RM20 billion needed for privatisation. The RM4.5 billion upfront cost to buy out PLUS minorities, by itself, would trump the RM2.8 billion compensation paid to PLUS in the six years between 2003 and 2008. As the value of money depreciates over time, the huge upfront cost is certainly more costly compared to the periodic compensation.

Moreover, with its 64% ownership in the toll concessionaire, the government is the major beneficiary of PLUS’ profits, which includes any compensation from the government. PLUS pays dividends on a regular basis and has promised to pay at least 16 sen a share for FY2009, the same as in FY2008 and two sen higher than in FY2007.

For instance, based on its FY2008 results, dividends paid out amounted to RM725 million. Khazanah’s 64% is RM464.2 million while the EPF would have received RM69.5 million based on its 9.59% interest on April 30 last year. Now, how does this compare with the RM730 million in compensation that the government paid to PLUS last year? Netting what the government received in the form of dividends, the outflow is really not that scary!

PLUS has promised a minimum payout of 16 sen per share this year, the same as last year. So, the cash will still keep coming in the future, which is why the EPF has upped its stake in PLUS to 11.38%. Also, given that the EPF is currently a beneficiary of PLUS’ dividends, is it fair to ask the provident fund to forgo the dividends and do national service?

In addition, the North-South Expressway (NSE) is not a highway that average consumers use on a regular basis. One could argue that businesses would be a bigger beneficiary of lower toll rates than the man in the street who does not frequently go on long-distance trips.

By privatising PLUS, what message is the government sending if it does not have a follow-up plan for other toll roads? Does the government then apologise to, say, consumers in the Klang Valley who use inter-city toll roads like Lebuhraya Damansara-Puchong (LDP) several times a day by telling them it is not as easy to privatise the other toll roads?

Equally, residents outside the Klang Valley could well argue that too much money is being spent privatising urban toll roads, especially in the Klang Valley, if the government were to privatise the likes of LDP.

Also, there is a greater challenge to keep maintenance costs down when an entity is in private hands, especially when profits are supposedly not a priority.

A lesser but significant factor is this: One important ingredient of a privatisation move is the element of surprise. This is to keep costs down. The publicity surrounding lobbyists with good intentions also means that the government has lost the element of surprise, at least for now. So, for the time being, the status quo is the best option, considering that Khazanah and the EPF are receiving healthy dividends that are comparable to the compensation PLUS receives.


This articel appeared in the Corporate page, The Edge Malaysia, Issue 750, April 13-19, 2009.
Last Updated on Tuesday, 28 April 2009 16:08
 

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